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Abstract
We consider domains with a natural property called top-circularity. We show that if such a
domain satisfies either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property, then it is
dictatorial. We obtain the result in Sato (2010) as a corollary. Further, it follows from our results
that the union of a top-connected single-peaked domain and a top-connected single-dipped
domain is dictatorial.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION
The coincidence of strategy-proofness and dictatorship has always been an intriguing question
since Alan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite proposed their impossibility result (Gibbard (1973),
Satterthwaite (1975)) - famously known as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite (GS) Theorem - which
states that every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function (SCF) defined over the
unrestricted domain of preferences (provided that there are at least three alternatives) is dictatorial.
However, the unrestricted domain assumption in the GS theorem is far from being the necessary
condition for dictatorship. A domain of preferences is called dictatorial if every unanimous and
strategy-proof SCF on it is dictatorial.
∗The authors wish to thank Madhuparna Karmakar, Manipushpak Mitra, Hans Peters, Soumyarup Sadhukhan,





Apart from being a generalization of the GS theorem, dictatorial domains have garnered a lot
of interest in the literature because dictatorial rules satisfy a desirable property called tops-onlyness
and a stronger incentive requirement called group strategy-proofness. At present, there is a sizeable
literature on dictatorial domains as seen in the works of Barbera` and Peleg (1990), Aswal et al.
(2003), Sato (2010), and Pramanik (2015). However, the existing results on dictatorial domains are
mostly of theoretical interest and not of much practical use. Hence, the main motivation of this
paper is to find dictatorial domains with some natural structure so that they can be applied to
some economic and political environment.
1.2 OUR CONTRIBUTION
A crucial property of a dictatorial domain is that for every alternative a, there must be at least
two preferences ab . . . and ac . . . in the domain, where b 6= c.1,2 A domain of practical importance
of such type is the one whose top-graph comprises of a maximal cycle.3 We call such a domain a
top-circular domain.
We prove by means of an example that the top-circular domains are not dictatorial. In view of
that, we identify two conditions called the maximal conflict property and the weak conflict property
such that if a top-circular domain satisfies either of these two conditions, then it becomes a
dictatorial domain.4 We obtain the dictatorial result in Sato (2010) as a corollary of our result.
We apply this result to the problem of locating a public facility. For certain public facilities such
as metro stations, hospitals etc., it is known to the social planner that agents have single-peaked
preferences as they want the facility to be located closer to their own locations. On the other
hand, for facilities like garbage dumps or nuclear plants, it is known to the social planner that the
agents have single-dipped preferences. For both these cases, it is well-known that one can design
non-dictatorial rules that satisfy unanimity and strategy-proofness.5
1We denote by ab . . . a preference which places a at the top and b at the second-ranked position.
2Roy and Storcken (2016) shows that this property is necessary and sufficient for dictatorship on a large class of
domains which they call short-path-connected domains. However, the domains that we consider are not short-path-
connected.
3The top-graph of a domain is defined as the graph where nodes are alternatives and there is an edge between two
alternatives a, b if there are preferences ab . . . and ba . . . in the domain.
4Several domains of practical importance such as the maximal single-peaked domain, the maximal single-dipped
domain, and maximal single crossing domains satisfy the maximal conflict property. Also, maximal single-peaked
domain satisfies the weak conflict property.
5Moulin (1980), Barbera` et al. (1993) and Weymark (2011) characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on
the single-peaked domains as min-max rules. Peremans and Storcken (1999) and Manjunath (2014) characterize the
unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on the single-dipped domains as voting by extended committees.
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However, for facilities like shopping malls, factories etc., the social planner may not have clear
knowledge on whether the agents want it to be closer or farther away. This is because, some
individuals may be concerned about the resulting congestion, pollution etc., whereas some others
may want to minimize their commuting distance. In such a situation, the relevant admissible
domain is the union of a single-peaked and a single-dipped domain.6 Our result shows that every
unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on such a domain is dictatorial.
1.3 REMAINDER
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the usual social choice framework in
Section 2. Section 3 presents our main results and Section 4 discusses applications of the same.
The last section concludes the paper. All the omitted proofs are collected in Appendix A.
2. THE MODEL
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of agents, who collectively choose an element from a finite set X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xm} of at least three alternatives. A preference P over X is a complete, transitive, and
antisymmetric binary relation (also called a linear order) defined on X. We denote by L(X)
the set of all preferences over X. An alternative x ∈ X is called the kth ranked alternative in a
preference P ∈ L(X), denoted by rk(P), if |{a ∈ X | aPx}| = k− 1. For ease of presentation, by
ab . . . c . . . d . . ., we denote a preference P where r1(P) = a, r2(P) = b and cPd. Also, by ab . . . c,
we denote a preference P where r1(P) = a, r2(P) = b, and rm(P) = c. We denote by D ⊆ L(X)
a set of admissible preferences over X. A preference profile, denoted by PN, is defined as an
element of Dn.
For simplicity, we do not use braces for singleton sets, for instance, we use the notation i to
mean {i}.
Definition 2.1. A social choice function (SCF) f on a domainD is defined as a mapping f : Dn → X.
6Alternative models that consider similar practical situations exist in the literature. For instance, Thomson (2008)
and Feigenbaum and Sethuraman (2014) partition the set of agents into those who can only have single-peaked
preferences and those that can only have single-dipped preferences. On the other hand, Unzu and Vorsatz (2015)
considers a situation where the social planner is informed about the location of the agents but agents can have
single-peaked preferences with the peak at her location or single-dipped preferences with the dip at her location.
Though the domain restriction considered in the aforementioned models are close in spirit with ours, they admit
non-dictatorial, unanimous, and strategy-proof SCFs.
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Definition 2.2. An SCF f : Dn → X is unanimous if for all PN ∈ Dn such that r1(Pi) = x for all
i ∈ N and some x ∈ X, we have f (PN) = x.
Definition 2.3. An SCF f : Dn → X is manipulable if there exists a profile PN ∈ Dn, an agent
i ∈ N, and a preference P′i ∈ D of agent i such that f (P′i , P−i)Pi f (PN). An SCF f is strategy-proof
if it is not manipulable.
Definition 2.4. Given an SCF f : D2 → X, we define the option set of agent i ∈ {1, 2} at preference




REMARK 2.1. Note that if an SCF f : D2 → X is unanimous, then r1(Pj) ∈ Oi(Pj) for all Pj ∈ D.





Oi(Pj) = x if and only if x ∈ Oi(Pj) and xPiy for all y ∈ Oi(Pj) \ x.
Definition 2.5. An SCF f : Dn → X is dictatorial if there exists an agent i ∈ N such that for all
profiles PN ∈ Dn, f (PN) = r1(Pi).
REMARK 2.2. Note that an SCF f : D2 → X is dictatorial if and only if there is i ∈ {1, 2} such that
Oi(Pj) = {r1(Pj)} for all Pj ∈ D.
Definition 2.6. A domain D is called dictatorial if every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF
f : Dn → X is dictatorial.
Definition 2.7. A domain D is regular if for all x ∈ X, there exists P ∈ D such that r1(P) = x.
REMARK 2.3. All the domains we consider in this paper are regular.
Now, we introduce a few graph theoretic notions. A graph G is defined as a pair 〈V, E〉, where
V is the set of nodes and E ⊆ {{u, v} | u, v ∈ V and u 6= v} is the set of edges. All the graphs we
consider in this paper are of the kind G = 〈X, E〉, i.e., whose node set is the set of alternatives.
Definition 2.8. The top-graph of a domain D is defined as the graph 〈X, E〉 such that {x, y} ∈ E if
and only if there exist two preferences P, P′ ∈ D with r1(P) = r2(P′) = x and r2(P) = r1(P′) = y.
Now, we introduce the notion of a top-circular domain.
Definition 2.9. A domain C with top-graph 〈X, E〉 is called top-circular if {xi, xj} ∈ E for all i, j
with |i− j| ∈ {1, m− 1}.
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Below, we present a top-circular domain and its top-graph.
Example 2.1. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}. Consider the domain given in Table 1. Figure 1
presents the top-graph of this domain. Note that this graph contains a maximal cycle given
by (x1, x2, . . . , x5, x1). Further, note that such a graph may contain some additional edges like
{x1, x3} and {x2, x5}.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14
x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5 x1 x1 x3 x2 x5
x2 x1 x3 x2 x4 x3 x5 x4 x1 x5 x3 x1 x5 x2
x5 x4 x5 x4 x2 x1 x3 x1 x2 x3 x5 x4 x3 x4
x4 x5 x1 x1 x1 x5 x1 x3 x3 x4 x2 x5 x4 x3
x3 x3 x4 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2 x4 x2 x4 x2 x1 x1






Figure 1: Top-graph of a top-circular domain
3. MAIN RESULT
Our following example shows that a top-circular domain admits unanimous, strategy-proof, and
non-dictatorial rules.
Example 3.1. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. By P = x1x2x3x4, we mean a preference P such that
5
x1Px2Px3Px4. Consider the following domain:
D = {x1x2x4x3, x2x1x3x4, x2x3x4x1, x3x2x4x1, x3x4x1x2, x4x3x1x2, x4x1x3x2, x1x4x2x3}.
It can be easily verified that the two-agent SCF on the domain D given in Table 2 is unanimous,
strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial.
P1
P2 x1x2x4x3 x2x1x3x4 x2x3x4x1 x3x2x4x1 x3x4x1x2 x4x3x1x2 x4x1x3x2 x1x4x2x3
x1x2x4x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x1
x2x1x3x4 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x2
x2x3x4x1 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x2
x3x2x4x1 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x3x4x1x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x4x3x1x2 x4 x3 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4
x4x1x3x2 x4 x3 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4
x1x4x2x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x1
Table 2: A non-dictatorial rule on a top-circular domain
In view of Example 3.1, we present below two conditions, and show that if a top-circular
domain satisfies either of the two, then it is dictatorial.
Definition 3.1. A domain D satisfies the maximal conflict property if there exist P, P′ ∈ D such that
rk(P) = rm−k+1(P′) = xk for all k = 1, . . . , m.
Definition 3.2. A domain D satisfies the weak conflict property if
(i) {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1} ⊆ D, and
(ii) for all k = 2, . . . , m − 1, there are two preferences P = xkxk−1 . . . x1 . . . xk+1 . . . and P′ =
xkxk+1 . . . xm . . . xk−1 . . . in the domain D.
In the following, we present an example of a top-circular domain with the maximal conflict
property.
Example 3.2. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}. Then, the domain C = {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9,
P10, P11, P12, P13, P14} as given in Table 3 is a top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict
property.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14
x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5 x6 x6 x7 x7 x1
x2 x1 x3 x2 x4 x3 x5 x4 x6 x5 x7 x6 x1 x7
x3 x6 x5 x6 x2 x1 x7 x1 x7 x7 x3 x5 x5 x4
x4 x5 x1 x1 x6 x7 x1 x3 x3 x1 x5 x4 x3 x2
x5 x3 x4 x4 x5 x2 x2 x2 x4 x4 x4 x3 x4 x3
x6 x7 x7 x7 x1 x6 x6 x7 x1 x2 x1 x2 x2 x6
x7 x4 x6 x5 x7 x5 x3 x6 x2 x3 x2 x1 x6 x5
Table 3: A top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict property
Now, we present an example of a top-circular domain with the weak conflict property.
Example 3.3. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}. Then, the domain C = {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7,
P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14} as given in Table 4 is a top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict
property.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14
x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5 x6 x6 x7 x7 x1
x2 x1 x3 x2 x4 x3 x5 x4 x6 x5 x7 x6 x1 x7
x3 x6 x5 x6 x7 x1 x7 x1 x2 x1 x3 x4 x5 x4
x6 x3 x7 x1 x6 x7 x1 x6 x3 x7 x2 x2 x3 x5
x4 x4 x4 x5 x5 x5 x2 x2 x7 x4 x4 x5 x4 x2
x5 x7 x1 x4 x1 x6 x3 x7 x1 x2 x1 x3 x2 x6
x7 x5 x6 x7 x2 x2 x6 x3 x4 x3 x5 x1 x6 x3
Table 4: A top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict property
Now, we proceed to present our main results.
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict property. Then, C is a
dictatorial domain.
Theorem 3.2. Let C be a top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict property. Then, C is a dictatorial
domain.
The proofs of Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 are relegated to Appendix A.
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4. APPLICATIONS
4.1 LOCATING A PUBLIC FACILITY
In this section, we consider the problem of locating a public facility when the social planner does
not have any information whether it generates positive or negative externality for the agents. As
argued in Section 1, the relevant domain restriction in such problems is the union of a single-
peaked and a single-dipped domain. In what follows, we describe such domains formally, and
show that they are dictatorial.
Definition 4.1. A preference P ∈ L(X) is called single-peaked if r1(P) = xi and [j < k ≤ i or i ≤
k < j] imply xkPxj.
Definition 4.2. A domain Dp is called a top-connected single-peaked domain if
(i) every preference in Dp is single-peaked, and
(ii) for every two alternatives xi, xi+1 ∈ X, there are two preferences P, P′ ∈ D such that
r1(P) = r2(P′) = xi and r2(P) = r1(P′) = xi+1.
Definition 4.3. A preference P ∈ L(X) is called single-dipped if rm(P) = xi and [j < k ≤ i or i ≤
k < j] imply xjPxk.
Definition 4.4. A domain Dd is called a top-connected single-dipped domain if
(i) every preference in Dd is single-dipped, and
(ii) there are two preferences P, P′ ∈ D such that r1(P) = r2(P′) = x1 and r2(P) = r1(P′) = xm.
A domain D is called the union of a top-connected single-peaked and a top-connected single-
dipped domain if D = Dp ∪ Dd, where Dp is a top-connected single-peaked and Dd is a top-
connected single-dipped domain. It is easy to verify that the union of a single-peaked and a
single-dipped domain is a top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict property. Thus, we
have the following corollary of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 4.1. Let D be the union of a top-connected single-peaked and a top-connected single-dipped
domain. Then, D is a dictatorial domain.
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4.2 CIRCULAR DOMAINS
The notion of circular domains is introduced in Sato (2010), where he shows that a circular domain
is dictatorial. However, we obtain this result as a corollary of our result.
Definition 4.5. A domain D is called circular if it is a top-circular domain satisfying the property
that for all k = 1, . . . , m, there are two preferences xkxk+1 . . . xk−1 and xkxk−1 . . . xk+1 in the domain
D.
Note that a circular domain is a top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict property.
Thus, we have the following corollary of Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 4.2 (Sato (2010)). Let D be a circular domain. Then, D is a dictatorial domain.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we prove that any unanimous and strategy-proof social choice rule on a top-circular
domain satisfying either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property is dictatorial.
Our result is independent from the existing results on dictatorial domains.
Since dictatorial rules are tops-only, Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 imply that top-circular domains
satisfying either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property are tops-only. Chat-
terji and Sen (2011) provides sufficient conditions for a domain to be tops-only, however, our
domain restrictions do not satisfy their condition. Moreover, since dictatorial rules are also group-
strategy-proof, it follows that the notions of strategy-proofness and group-strategy-proofness are
equivalent for the domains we consider.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. The following proposition in Aswal et al.
(2003) allows us to restrict our attention to the case of two agents.
Proposition A.1 (Aswal et al. (2003)). Let D be a regular domain such that every unanimous and
strategy-proof SCF f : D2 → X is dictatorial. Then, every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF f : Dn →
X is dictatorial.
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The following proposition in Sanver (2007) allows us to restrict our attention to minimal
top-circular domains satisfying either the maximal conflict or the weak conflict property.7
Proposition A.2 (Sanver (2007)). A superset of a regular dictatorial domain is also dictatorial.
For all the subsequent results, let C be a minimal top-circular domain. Suppose f : C2 → X is
a unanimous and strategy-proof SCF and Oi(Pj) is the corresponding option set of agent i at a
preference Pj of agent j ∈ {1, 2} \ i. We prove a sequence of lemmas that we use in the proofs of
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2.
The following lemma establishes a property of a minimal top-circular domain. We assume for
this lemma that 0 ≡ m and m + 1 ≡ 1.
Lemma A.1. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain and let P2, P′2 ∈ C be such that r1(P2) = r1(P′2) =
xk. Then, for all j ∈ {k− 1, k + 1}, xj ∈ O1(P2) if and only if xj ∈ O1(P′2).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exist P2, P′2 ∈ C with r1(P2) = r1(P′2) = xk such that
xj ∈ O1(P2) and xj 6∈ O1(P′2) for some j ∈ {k− 1, k + 1}. Consider P1 ∈ C such that r1(P1) = xj
and r2(P1) = xk. Such a preference exists in C as |j− k| = 1. Then, by the strategy-proofness
of f , f (P1, P2) = xj and f (P1, P′2) = xk. This means agent 2 manipulates at (P1, P2) via P′2, a
contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The subsequent lemmas establish few crucial properties of a minimal top-circular domain C
such that {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1} ⊆ C. Note that if a minimal top-circular domain C satisfies
either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property, then such two preferences are
there in C.
Lemma A.2. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain such that {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1} ⊆ C. Then,
for all P2 ∈ {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1}, rm(P2) /∈ O1(P2) implies O1(P2) = {r1(P2)}.
Proof. We prove the lemma for the case where P2 = x1x2 . . . xm ∈ C, the proof of the same for
the other case is analogous. Let P2 = x1x2 . . . xm ∈ C and let rm(P2) = xm /∈ O1(P2). We show
O1(P2) = {r1(P2)}. Assume for contradiction that xj ∈ O1(P2) for some j 6= 1, m. Let P′2 ∈ C be
such that r1(P′2) = x1 and r2(P′2) = xm. Since xm /∈ O1(P2), by Lemma A.1, xm /∈ O1(P′2). Let
P1 = xmxm−1 . . . x1. By unanimity and strategy-proofness, we must have f (P1, P′2) ∈ {x1, xm} as
otherwise, agent 2 manipulates at (P1, P′2) via a preference which places xm at the top. Also, since
7A top-circular domain is minimal if none of its subsets is top-circular.
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xm /∈ O1(P′2), we have f (P1, P′2) = x1. However, since xj ∈ O1(P2) and xjP1x1, it must be that
f (P1, P2) 6= x1. Because r1(P2) = x1 = r1(P′2), this means agent 2 manipulates at (P1, P2) via P′2, a
contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma A.3. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain such that {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1} ⊆ C and
let O1(P2) ∈ {{r1(P2)}, X} for all P2 ∈ {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1}. Suppose Pˆ2, P¯2 ∈ C is such that
r1(Pˆ2) = x1 and r1(P¯2) = xm. Then, O1(Pˆ2) = {x1} if and only if O1(P¯2) = {xm}.
Proof. Let Pˆ2, P¯2 ∈ C be such that r1(Pˆ2) = x1 and r1(P¯2) = xm. It is sufficient to show that
O1(Pˆ2) = {x1} implies O1(P¯2) = {xm}. By strategy-proofness, it is enough to show that O1(P¯2) =
{xm} where P¯2 = xmxm−1 . . . x1.
Assume for contradiction that O1(Pˆ2) = {x1} and O1(P¯2) 6= {xm}. By the assumption of
the lemma, O1(P¯2) 6= {xm} implies O1(P¯2) = X. Consider P¯′2 ∈ C such that r1(P¯′2) = xm and
r2(P¯′2) = x1. Since O1(P¯2) 6= {xm}, it follows from strategy-proofness that O1(P¯′2) 6= {xm}. We
show xj 6∈ O1(P¯′2) for all j 6= 1, m. Suppose not. Then, f (P1, P¯′2) = xj for some P1 ∈ C with
xj at the top. However, because O1(Pˆ2) = {x1}, agent 2 manipulates at (P1, P¯′2) via Pˆ2. Since
O1(P¯′2) 6= {xm} and xj /∈ O1(P¯′2) for all j 6= 1, m, it must be that O1(P¯′2) = {x1, xm}. However, since
O1(P¯2) = X, which in turn means xm−1 ∈ O1(P¯2), by Lemma A.1, we must have xm−1 ∈ O1(P¯′2),
a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
A.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 3.1. First, we establish a few properties of a
top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict property.
Lemma A.4. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict property. Let
P, P′ ∈ C be such that rk(P) = rm−k+1(P′) = xk for all k = 1, . . . , m. Then, for all P2 ∈ {P, P′},
rm(P2) ∈ O1(P2) implies O1(P2) = X.
Proof. We prove this lemma for the case where P2 = P, the proof of the same for the other
case is analogous. Let P2 = P. Suppose xm ∈ O1(P2). We show O1(P2) = X. We prove this
by induction. Since xm ∈ O1(P2), it is sufficient to show that for all 1 < k ≤ m, xk ∈ O1(P2)
implies xk−1 ∈ O1(P2). Assume for contradiction that xk ∈ O1(P2) but xk−1 /∈ O1(P2) for some
1 < k ≤ m. Consider P1 = xk−1xk . . . ∈ C. Since xk ∈ O1(P2) and xk−1 /∈ O1(P2), f (P1, P2) = xk.
However, this means agent 2 manipulates at (P1, P2) via a preference which places xk−1 at the top,
a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
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REMARK A.1. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict property,
and let P, P′ ∈ C be such that rk(P) = rm−k+1(P′) = xk for all k = 1, . . . , m. Then, it follows
from Lemma A.2 that for all P2 ∈ {P, P′}, rm(P2) /∈ O1(P2) implies O1(P2) = {r1(P2)}. Again, it
follows from Lemma A.4 that for all P2 ∈ {P, P′}, rm(P2) ∈ O1(P2) implies O1(P2) = X. Thus, for
all P2 ∈ {P, P′}, we have O1(P2) ∈ {{r1(P2)}, X}.
Lemma A.5. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain satisfying the maximal conflict property. Further,
let P, P′ ∈ C be such that rk(P) = rm−k+1(P′) = xk for all k = 1, . . . , m. Then, for all P2 ∈ {P, P′},
O1(P2) = {r1(P2)} implies O1(P¯2) = {r1(P¯2)} for all P¯2 ∈ C.
Proof. It is enough to prove the lemma for the case where P2 = P, the proof for the other case is
analogous. Let P2 = P. Suppose O1(P2) = {r1(P2)}. We show O1(P¯2) = {r1(P¯2)} for all P¯2 ∈ C.
By strategy-proofness, this means O1(P¯2) = {r1(P¯2)} for all P¯2 ∈ C with r1(P¯2) = x1. Moreover,
by Lemma A.3 and Remark A.1, we have O1(P¯2) = {r1(P¯2)} for all P¯2 ∈ C with r1(P¯2) = xm. Take
j 6= 1, m and Pˆ2 ∈ C with r1(Pˆ2) = xj. We show O1(Pˆ2) = {r1(Pˆ2)}.
First, we show O2(P1) = O2(P′1) = X, where rm−k+1(P1) = rk(P
′
1) = xk for all k = 1, . . . , m.
We show this for P1, the proof of the same for P′1 is analogous. Since O1(P2) = {x1}, we have
f (P1, P2) = x1. Because rm(P1) = x1, this means rm(P1) ∈ O2(P1). By Lemma A.4, this means
O2(P1) = X.
Now, we complete the proof of the lemma. Assume for contradiction that xl ∈ O1(Pˆ2) for
some xl 6= r1(Pˆ2) = xj. Since rm−k+1(P1) = rk(P′1) = xk for all k = 1, . . . , m, we must have either
xlP1xj or xlP′1xj. Assume without loss of generality that xlP1xj. Since O2(P1) = X and r1(Pˆ2) = xj,
f (P1, Pˆ2) = xj. Let Pˆ1 ∈ C such that r1(Pˆ1) = xl. Since xl ∈ O1(Pˆ2) and r1(Pˆ1) = xl, we have
f (Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = xl. This means agent 1 manipulates at (P1, Pˆ2) via Pˆ1, a contradiction. Therefore,
O1(Pˆ2) = {r1(Pˆ2)}, which completes the proof of the lemma. 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In view of Propositions A.1 and A.2, it sufficient to show that a minimal
top-circular domain with the maximal conflict property is dictatorial for two agents. Consider
P2 ∈ C such that rk(P2) = xk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m. By Remark A.1, we have O1(P2) ∈ {{r1(P2)}, X}.
Suppose O1(P2) = {r1(P2)}. Then, by Lemma A.5, it follows that O1(P′2) = {r1(P′2)} for all
P′2 ∈ C, which implies agent 2 is the dictator.
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Now, suppose O1(P2) = X. Consider P1 ∈ C such that r1(P1) = xm. Since O1(P2) = X, we
have f (P1, P2) = xm. We claim O2(P1) = {r1(P1)}. Assume for contradiction that xj ∈ O2(P1)
for some j 6= m. Since rm(P2) = xm, we have xjP2xm. However, since xj ∈ O2(P1), agent 2
manipulates at (P1, P2) via some preference P¯2 with r1(P¯2) = xj. Therefore, O2(P1) = {r1(P1)}.
By Lemma A.5, this means O2(P1) = {r1(P1)} for all P1 ∈ C, which implies agent 1 is the dictator.
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
A.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 3.2. First, we establish a few properties of a
top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict property.
Lemma A.6. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict property. Suppose
P2 ∈ {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1} ⊆ C. Then, rm(P2) ∈ O1(P2) implies O1(P2) = X.
Proof. It is enough to prove the lemma for P2 = x1x2 . . . xm ∈ C, the proof for the other case
is analogous. Suppose xm ∈ O1(P2). We show O1(P2) = X. We prove this by induction. By
unanimity, x1 ∈ O1(P2). Therefore, it is sufficient to show that for all 1 ≤ k < m, xk ∈ O1(P2)
implies xk+1 ∈ O1(P2). Assume for contradiction that xk ∈ O1(P2) and xk+1 /∈ O1(P2) for some
1 ≤ k < m. Let Pˆ2 = xkxk+1 . . . xm . . . xk−1 . . . ∈ C. Note that since xm ∈ O1(P2) and rm(P2) = xm,
by strategy-proofness, it must be that xm ∈ O1(Pˆ2). Let P1 = xk+1xk+2 . . . xm . . . xk . . . ∈ C. By
unanimity and strategy-proofness, f (P1, Pˆ2) ∈ {xk, xk+1}, as otherwise agent 2 manipulates at
(P1, Pˆ2) via some preference with xk+1 at the top. Suppose f (P1, Pˆ2) = xk. Since xmP1xk and
xm ∈ O1(Pˆ2), this means agent 1 manipulates at (P1, Pˆ2) via some preference with xm at the top.
Therefore, we have f (P1, Pˆ2) = xk+1. Now, let P′1 = xk+1xk . . . ∈ C. Then, since f (P1, Pˆ2) = xk+1
and r1(P1) = r1(P′1) = xk+1, by strategy-proofness, f (P
′
1, Pˆ2) = xk+1. Also, because xk ∈ O1(P2)
and xk+1 /∈ O1(P2), we have f (P′1, P2) = xk. Therefore, agent 2 manipulates at (P′1, Pˆ2) via P2, a
contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
REMARK A.2. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict property. Then,
by using arguments similar to the ones employed in Remark A.1, it follows from Lemma A.2 and
Lemma A.6 that for all P2 ∈ {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1}, O1(P2) ∈ {{r1(P2)}, X}.
Lemma A.7. Let C be a minimal top-circular domain satisfying the weak conflict property. Further,
let P2 ∈ {x1x2 . . . xm, xmxm−1 . . . x1}. Then, O1(P2) = {r1(P2)} implies O1(P¯2) = {r1(P¯2)} for all
P¯2 ∈ C.
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Proof. We prove this lemma for the case where P2 = x1x2 . . . xm, the proof for the case where
P2 = xmxm−1 . . . x1 is analogous. Let P2 = x1x2 . . . xm. Suppose O1(P2) = {x1}. We show
O1(P¯2) = {r1(P¯2)} for all P¯2 ∈ C. By strategy-proofness, we have O1(P¯2) = {r1(P¯2)} for all
P¯2 ∈ C with r1(P¯2) = x1. By Lemma A.3 and Remark A.2, O1(P2) = {x1} implies O1(P¯2) = {xm}
for all P¯2 ∈ C with r1(P¯2) = xm. We prove the lemma using induction. Take 1 ≤ j < m. Suppose
O1(P¯2) = {xj} for all P¯2 ∈ C with r1(P¯2) = xj. We show O1(Pˆ2) = {xj+1} for all Pˆ2 ∈ C with
r1(Pˆ2) = xj+1. Take Pˆ2 ∈ C with r1(Pˆ2) = xj+1. We show O1(Pˆ2) = {xj+1}. By strategy-proofness,
it is enough to show this for Pˆ2 = xj+1xj . . ..
First, we claim xk /∈ O1(Pˆ2) for all k 6= j, j + 1. Assume for contradiction that xk ∈ O1(Pˆ2)
for some k 6= j, j + 1. Then, f (P1, Pˆ2) = xk for some P1 ∈ C with r1(P1) = xk. However, since
O1(P¯2) = {xj} for all P¯2 ∈ C with r1(P¯2) = xj, agent 2 manipulates at (P1, Pˆ2) via some preference
P¯2 with r1(P¯2) = xj.
Now, we show xj /∈ O1(Pˆ2). Assume for contradiction that xj ∈ O1(Pˆ2). Let Pˆ′2 = xj+1xj+2 . . . xm
. . . xj . . .. Then, by Lemma A.1, xj ∈ O1(Pˆ′2). Take P1 ∈ C such that r1(P1) = xj. Then, because
xj ∈ O1(Pˆ′2), f (P1, Pˆ′2) = xj. Now, take P2 ∈ C with r1(P2) = xm. Since O1(P2) = {xm}, we have
f (P1, P2) = xm. This means agent 2 manipulates at (P1, Pˆ′2) via P2. This completes the proof of the
lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof of Theorem 3.2 follows by using analogous arguments as for the
proof of Theorem 3.1. 
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